

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

SECRET

Action
SS

EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

Control: 376

Rec'd: November 1, 1962
6:40 p.m.

Info

FROM: New York

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1587, November 1, 6 p.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR. 0

REVIEWED BY *[Signature]* DATE *1/4/88*
() EXEMPT () DECLASSIFY IN PART
() DENY () Non-responsive info.
FOI, EO or PA exceptions

EYES ONLY

1587 NOV 1, 5:40 PM FROM USN) NEW YORK SIGNED STEVENSON OADR
() CLASSIFY as _____ TS authority to: _____
() EXEMPT () DENY () DECLASSIFY IN PART () Non-responsive info. () FOI, EO or PA exceptions

PLEASE. PASS WHITE HOUSE AND DOD

EYES ONLY SECRETARY

FROM BALL AND GILPATRIC

BALL AND GILPATRIC MET THIS MORNING WITH GENERAL RIKHYE FOR FIRST HAND REPORT ON HIS IMPRESSIONS OF CUBAN TRIP. THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION RIKHYE WAS FORTHRIGHT, CANDID AND VERY HELPFUL.

1. SAMS: RIKHYE SAID THAT CASTRO RANTED AND RAVED ABOUT OVERFLIGHTS TO SUCH AN EXTENT AS TO SUGGEST THAT SAMS WERE ACTUALLY IN CUBAN HANDS AND OPERATED BY CUBANS. RIKHYE FIRST STATED THAT IN HIS OPINION IT WAS "PROBABLE" THAT CUBANS DO HAVE SAMS. LATER IN CONVERSATION HE MODIFIED THIS VIEW STATING THAT CASTRO MAY HAVE BEEN BOASTING AND PERHAPS THE MOST LIKELY ASSUMPTION WAS THAT THE SAMS WERE CONTROLLED BY THE RUSSIANS BUT WITH SOME CUBANS IN THE CREWS. CASTRO HAD SAID THAT CUBANS HAD SHOT DOWN THE U-2 LAST WEEK BUT RIKHYE FELT THAT THIS WAS MORE LIKELY RHETORIC THAN THE ASSERTION OF AN ACTUAL FACT.

2. IL-28'S: RIKHYE SAID THAT THERE WAS NO DEFINITIVE DISCUSSION AS TO WHETHER THE IL-28'S WERE INCLUDED IN SOVIET REMOVAL PLANS. HOWEVER, HE DID FEEL THAT THE CUBANS HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF MANNING THEM, EVEN THOUGH IT IS HIS IMPRESSION THAT AT THE MOMENT THERE IS NO CUBAN OPERATIONAL UNIT ORGANIZED TO MAN SUCH PLANES. HE WAS STRUCK BY FACT THAT HE SAW NO AIRFORCE PERSONNEL AMONG THE MILITARY THEY SAW IN HAVANA AND THAT THE CUBAN AIRFORCE IS NOT VERY SUBSTANTIAL.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS NOT CLASSIFIED

87 - 0082 116

SECRET

-2- 1587, November 1, 1961 from New York.

RIKHYE FEELS THAT IF THE IL-28'S WERE LEFT BEHIND THERE WOULD BE NO NUCLEAR WAR-HEADS LEFT WITH THEM. HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS REPEATED TO THE UN PARTY MANY TIMES THAT THEY WERE DETERMINED TO TAKE OUT ALL EQUIPMENT WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAS REGARDED AS OFFENSIVE AND THIS WOULD INCLUDE THE IL-28'S.

3. MAJOR ANDERSON: CASTRO AGREED RETURN THE BODY OF MAJOR ANDERSON THROUGH THE UN. THE UN PARTY BELIEVES THIS IS BEST HANDLED BY THE SWISS. THE GENERAL SAID THAT THE SWISS COULD MOVE THE BODY TO THE VICINITY OF GUANTANAMO WHERE IT COULD BE PICKED UP BY THE AMERICANS AND FLOWN FROM THAT BASE TO THE UNITED STATES. WE RECOMMEND THAT THE DEPARTMENT IMMEDIATELY SET IN TRAIN STEPS TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE.

4. DISMANTLING: GENERAL STAZENKO, THE SOVIET GENERAL COMMANDING THE CUBAN OPERATION, TOLD THE UN PARTY THAT HIS MEN HAD BEEN WORKING DAY AND NIGHT SINCE SUNDAY AFTERNOON TO DISMANTLE THE MISSILES. THE RUSSIANS ASSERTED THAT THE MISSILES ARE ALREADY IN SEAPORTS. ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT WILL BE AT THE SEAPORTS BY TONIGHT. THE REMAINDER, WHICH THE RUSSIANS CALLED "ODD AND SODS" WILL BE BROUGHT IN BY FRIDAY. THE RUSSIANS WILL THEN DESTROY ALL SITES BULLDOZING ALL CONCRETE STRUCTURES AND PLATFORMS. IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THERE WERE ACTUALLY ANY ATOMIC WAR-HEADS IN CUBA, THE GENERAL SAID THE MATTER HAD NOT BEEN RAISED WITH THE RUSSIANS.

5. CHINESE INFLUENCE: THE UN PARTY RECEIVED THE IMPRESSION THROUGH SEVERAL CONVERSATIONS THAT THE CHINESE HAD GIVEN THE CUBANS FAR MORE ECONOMIC HELP THAN THE RUSSIANS. THE CUBANS, HE SAID, HAD ACCEPTED THE MISSILES WITHOUT APPARENTLY REALIZING THAT THEY WOULD BE RETAINED UNDER RUSSIAN CONTROL AND WOULD NOT BE TRANSFERRED TO THEM. THE CHINESE, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAD PROVIDED FOOD AND CLOTHING. RIKHYE SAID THAT THE DIPLOMATS IN HAVANA ANTICIPATE THAT THE CHINESE INFLUENCE WILL INCREASE IN THE FUTURE.

6. UN PRESENCE: THE SYG ATTEMPTED TO OBTAIN THE AGREEMENT OF CASTRO TO MEASURES FOR UN VERIFICATION. WHEN CASTRO VIOLENTLY REJECTED ALL FORMS OF GROUND INSPECTION THE SYG TURNED THE DISCUSSION TO STATIONING OF UN PRESENCE IN

SECRET

SECRET

-3- 1587, November 1, 6 p.m. From New York

CUBA FOR GENERAL PURPOSES OF PEACE KEEPING. CASTRO LISTENED WITH INCREASING INTEREST TO THE SYG'S DESCRIPTION OF "UN PRESENCE" AND HOW IT OPERATED. HE INDICATED AN APPARENT WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT SUCH A UN PRESENCE.

THE SYG THEN POINTED OUT THAT A UN PRESENCE WOULD OPERATE NOT MERELY TO PROTECT CASTRO FROM INVASION BUT ALSO TO IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON HIS UTILIZING CUBA AS A BASE FOR SUBVERSION AND SABOTAGE ELSEWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA. CASTRO REPLIED THAT WHATEVER SUBVERSION HE HAD CONDUCTED HAD BEEN PURELY FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES AND THAT IF CUBA WERE SECURE FROM INVASION HE WOULD HAVE NO FURTHER INTEREST IN TRYING TO SUBVERT OTHER LATIN AMERICAN NATIONS. THE CUBAN REVOLUTION WAS STRICTLY FOR CUBANS AND NOT FOR EXPORT. CASTRO SUGGESTED HOWEVER THAT IF THERE WERE TO BE UN REPRESENTATIVES STATIONED IN CUBA HE WOULD INSIST ON UN REPRESENTATIVES BEING LOCATED IN REFUGEE CAMPS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CERTAIN OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES SUCH AS GUATEMALA.

7. OVERFLIGHTS: THE QUESTION WAS ASKED AS TO WHY THE GENERAL HAD INDICATED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO DELAY OVER FLIGHTS UNTIL FRIDAY. HE ANSWERED THAT THERE WERE TWO REASONS FOR THE SUGGESTION. THE FIRST WAS THAT THE CUBANS SHOULD BE CALMER ON FRIDAY THAN ON THURSDAY AND THEREFORE LESS LIKELY TO FIRE AT US AIRCRAFT. THE SECOND WAS THAT THE US WOULD BE ABLE TO GET MUCH MORE DEFINITIVE PROOF OF COMPLETION OF THE DISMANTLING OF THE BASES BY FRIDAY THAN BY THURSDAY. THE GENERAL DID SUGGEST THAT IF WE UNDERTOOK OVERFLIGHTS WE SHOULD CHANGE THE FLIGHT PATTERN SO THAT THE CUBANS WOULD NOT BE READY WITH THEIR RESPONSE. HE ALSO NOTED THAT WE WOULD PROBABLY MEET SUBSTANTIAL OPPOSITION AROUND THE SEAPORTS WHERE THE CUBANS HAVE MASSED A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF CONVENTIONAL AA WEAPONS.

8. MISCELLANEOUS:

A) THE RUSSIANS HAD TOLD THE UN PARTY THAT SO FAR AS THEY WERE CONCERNED THE UN COULD INSPECT THE SITES AND ALL INCOMING SHIPMENTS.

SECRET

SECRET

-4- 1587, November 1, 6 p.m. from New York

B) HE NOTED THAT CASTRO WOULD MAKE A VIOLENTLY ANTI-RUSSIAN TV SPEECH TONIGHT. HE ALSO TOLD US IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE THAT THE SYG HAD PERSUADED CASTRO TO DELETE TWO VERY OFFENSIVE SENTENCES FROM THE SPEECH WHICH, IF RETAINED, WOULD ONLY TEND TO EXACERBATE THE SITUATION.

C) THE GENERAL HAD THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT MILITARY TECHNICIANS WOULD LEAVE WITH THE EQUIPMENT. THIS WAS IMPLIED BY A COMMENT OF GENERAL STAZENKO.

D) GENERAL STAZENKO IS YOUNG - IN HIS EARLY 40'S - AND SPEAKS ONLY RUSSIAN. HE APPEARED NAIVE AND NOT USED TO DEALING WITH DIPLOMATS. HE HAD BEEN IN CUBA ONLY A "FEW MONTHS". STAZENKO HAD STATED THE SOVIET MISSILE STATIONS WERE BUILT AND MANNED ENTIRELY BY RUSSIANS AND THAT THE CUBANS HAD HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THEM. STAZENKO SEEMED VERY FRANK. HE HAD APPARENTLY BEEN ORDERED BY MOSCOW TO BE CANDID WITH UN PARTY.

E) GENERAL RIKHYE SAW TWO KOMARS PATROLLING OFF THE COAST. THE CUBANS REFERRED TO THE KOMARS AS QUOTE THEIRS UNQUOTE. HE ASSUMES THAT THEY WILL BE LEFT WITH THE CUBANS.

STEVENSON

LTR/14

NOTE: RELAYED TO WHITE HOUSE 11/1/62.

SECRET